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ESSAYS
THE UNREALISTIC GEOGRAPHIC LIMITATIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT’S SCHOOL-SPEECH
PRECEDENTS: TINKER IN THE INTERNET AGE
Lee C. Baxter*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District1 is re-
garded as one of the most influential decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court.2 Tinker owes its distinguished status to its position as the
Court’s first decision to affirmatively uphold students’ First Amendment
rights and to the popularity of public school cases. These cases do, after all,
draw more than their fair share of attention because “a single case can tre-
mendously change longstanding community paradigms.”3 In time spent,
public schools are a second home to most American children; hence, the
rules applicable to schools vividly impact the country. The Tinker Court
held that a student retains her First Amendment rights while at school so
* 2012 graduate of the University of Montana School of Law. My interest in the topic of free-
speech in America’s schools began with my participation in the 2011 National Moot Court competition.
The author thanks University of Montana professors Larry Howell and Andrew King-Ries, whose in-
sightful coaching helped me develop the topic of this paper, and fellow moot-court teammates Sarah
Mazanec and David Bigger for their patience at practices that helped me hone this argument through
trial and error. The author specially thanks fellow Montana Law graduate and friend Katharine Leque
for her insightful (and many times ruthless) edits.
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. See e.g. Street Law, Landmark Cases of the U.S. Supreme Court, http://www.streetlaw.vorg/en/
landmark/cases/tinker_v_des_moines (accessed May 15, 2012).
3. Jesulon S. R. Gibbs, Student Speech on the Internet: The Role of First Amendment Protections
18 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2010). (Gibbs uses the example of Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) to demonstrate this principle.); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–425
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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long as her speech does not “materially and substantially disrupt” the
school.4 Tinker can be seen as a quid-pro-quo balancing of student rights
and school responsibilities: while at school, a student’s First Amendment
rights necessarily yield to the school’s duty to teach required subjects and
keep order; while at home, however, a student enjoys full First Amendment
rights because his or her speech does not have the potential to interrupt
school activities. While this arrangement reflected the reality of technologi-
cal limitations in 1969, the proliferation of internet use changed the second
part of the equation by empowering a student to impact the operation of the
school from home.
Indeed, internet use among teenagers is now “nearly universal.”5 Stu-
dents are using it for more than homework: they are also using the internet
to bully fellow students.6 While traditional bullying was done face-to-face,
internet bullying, or “cyberbullying,” need not take place within the school.
But the effects of cyberbullying are carried into the classroom.7 Fellow stu-
dents are not the only victims, as students are also using the internet to
attack teachers, resulting in disruption to operations of the school.8
Montana is no different. In a recent interview, a Billings middle-school
resource officer described off-campus “cyberbullying” as an “epidemic.”9
During the 2013 Legislative Session, Representative Ellie Hill of Missoula
introduced House Bill 527, which proposed to make cyberbullying a misde-
meanor crime.10 To paraphrase, the Bill made it illegal for someone to post
malicious content about a minor on the internet, create fictitious social me-
dia pages, or post or encourage others to post on the internet “private, per-
sonal or sexual information” about a minor if done so “with the purpose to
4. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–514.
5. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 951 (3d Cir. 2011) (Fisher, J., dissenting
with whom Scirica, Rendell, Barry, Jordan, and Vanaskie, JJ., joined) (citing Amanda Lenhart, et al.,
Pew Internet & American Life Project: Teens and Social Media 2 (2007) (noting 93% of teenagers use
the internet and 61% use it daily)).
6. See e.g. Kowlaski v. Berkeley Co. Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Renee L.
Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amend-
ment, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1213, 1214 (2003).
7. Servance, supra n. 6, at 1214 (“Internet harassment . . . may originate outside of school . . . but
carry its sting into the classroom.”). Servance further explains that bullying “manifests a wide range of
emotional harm, from low self-esteem, anxiety, and depression to social withdrawal. Eventually, some
bullied children strike back with violence, either toward the bully or more random targets.” Servance,
supra n. 6, at 1216–1217.
8. See e.g. J. S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851–852 (Pa. 2002).
9. Rob Rogers, SD2 Grapples with Rogue, Derogatory High School Facebook Pages, The Billings
Gazette (Mar. 22, 2013).
10. Mont. H. 527, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 18, 2013) (available at http://legiscan.com/MT/text/
HB527).
2
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terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, or torment a minor[.]”11 The Bill did not
pass, however.12
With a vacuum of legislation, school officials have stepped in by disci-
plining students who create websites attacking other students and teachers.
Montana’s Board of Public Instruction has added “anti-bullying guidelines”
to its required criteria for Montana’s public schools.13 Each school district
must “develop . . . methods of documenting bullying, protecting the victim
and disciplining the bully.”14 However, school officials stepping beyond the
schoolhouse to discipline students for online bullying has resulted in law-
suits across the country.15 While these lawsuits vary in many aspects, one
common thread is that all of the students allege the Tinker exception to the
First Amendment does not apply to student speech outside of school.
This article outlines the problem courts encounter when strictly apply-
ing Tinker’s geographical test in the internet age. Section II provides a brief
overview of the four Supreme Court “student-speech” cases and explains
that the Court has not addressed off-campus internet speech. Through the
example of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases, Section III shows the
Court previously has revised its constitutional rules to ensure that its rulings
are not outpaced by advances in technology. Section IV demonstrates that
lower courts are in disarray as to schools’ ability to discipline off-campus
internet speech and argues that the Court should revise its school-speech
framework to encompass such speech. Section V proposes a two-part test to
deal with student internet speech: first, courts should determine whether the
internet speech has a “sufficient nexus” to the school environment so as to
deem it “school speech,” and if so, courts should then apply Tinker to deter-
mine whether it was reasonably foreseeable the internet speech would cause
a substantial and material disruption to the operation of the school.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S SCHOOL-SPEECH PRECEDENT DOES NOT
ADDRESS OFF-CAMPUS, INTERNET SPEECH
The Supreme Court has addressed school speech in four cases. First,
under Tinker, a school may discipline a student for speech that materially
and substantially disrupts school.16 Second, consistent with Bethel School
District Number 403 v. Fraser,17 a school may also discipline a student for
11. Mont. H. 527, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. at 1 (available at http://legiscan.com/MT/text/HB527).
12. Mont. H. 527, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (available at http://legiscan.com/MT/text/HB527).
13. Associated Press, Montana Schools Step in After Legislature Refuses Anti-Bullying Bills, The
Missoulian (June 9, 2013).
14. Id.
15. Infra Section IV.
16. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
17. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
3
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speech that is offensively lewd or vulgar.18 Third, under Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier,19 a school may restrict speech “that students, parents,
teachers, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school.”20 And finally, under Morse v. Frederick,21
schools may discipline a student for speech “promoting illegal drug use.”22
However, none of these cases deal with off-campus speech.
The Court’s first school-speech case was Tinker. There, several stu-
dents planned to wear black armbands to school to promote a military truce
during escalation of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War.23
School officials discovered the plan and adopted a policy that prohibited
students from wearing armbands in school.24 Mary Beth Tinker and two of
her brothers wore armbands anyway.25 Upon their arrival at school, the Tin-
kers were suspended and their father subsequently sued the Des Moines
School District.26
The Court began its analysis with one of its most famous passages:
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”27 The Court’s
language implies that students retain the full gamut of First Amendment
rights outside the schoolhouse gate and the school does not have the author-
ity to discipline students for speech outside that gate.28 Ultimately, the
Court held that the First Amendment protected the Tinkers’ speech (wear-
ing armbands) because there was no evidence that could have reasonably
led the Des Moines School District to “forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities . . . .”29
While the Court was careful not to limit its holding to classroom set-
tings—by explaining the principle also applied to speech taking place in the
cafeteria, on the playing field, or on the campus during authorized hours—
nothing in the Court’s decision can be read as extending school authority to
18. Id. at 684–685.
19. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
20. Id. at 271.
21. 551 U.S. 393.
22. Id. at 408.
23. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
24. Id. at 504.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 506.
28. Kyle W. Brenton, BONGHITS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School Authority over Stu-
dent Cyberspeech through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1206, 1223 (2008).
29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
4
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off-campus speech.30 Combining this notable absence with the Court’s reli-
ance on the “special characteristics of the school environment” as the foun-
dation for its holding, Tinker itself did not contemplate school authority
over off-campus speech.
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court added to its school-speech
framework by deciding Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser31 and
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.32 In Fraser, a student, Matthew
Fraser, gave a speech at a school assembly that included “an elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”33 The Court ultimately upheld Fra-
ser’s suspension, but did so without applying the substantial and material
disruption test under Tinker.34 Instead, the Court added a new prong to its
student-speech analysis, concluding that schools could restrict student
speech that was offensively lewd or vulgar, even if that speech did not
cause a Tinker disruption.35 Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment,
writing separately to explain that schools only had the authority to punish
students for Fraser type speech at school: “If [Fraser] had given the same
speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized
simply because government officials considered his language to be inappro-
priate.”36
Two years after Fraser, the Court considered the scope of the school’s
authority to censor the content of a student newspaper. In Kuhlmeier, the
principal of a Missouri high school deleted two articles from the newspaper
he deemed inappropriate.37 Three staff members of the newspaper sued the
school district for violating their First Amendment rights.38 The Court be-
gan its First Amendment analysis by distinguishing the type of speech in
Tinker and Fraser from that of censoring a school newspaper—namely, that
the former cases dealt with silencing “student[s’] personal expression that
happens to occur on school premises,” while the latter deals with whether
the school must affirmatively “promote particular speech.”39 The Court an-
swered the second inquiry in the negative, holding that schools properly had
the authority to exercise editorial control over the content of their newspa-
pers as long as the censorship was related to “legitimate pedagogical con-
30. Id. at 512–513.
31. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 675.
32. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
33. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 677–678.
34. Id. at 680–683.
35. Id. at 683.
36. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
37. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263–264 (The first article chronicled Hazelwood students’ experiences
with pregnancy, while the second “discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school.”).
38. Id. at 262, 264.
39. Id. at 270–271 (emphasis added).
5
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cerns.”40 The Court found the principal’s actions in conformance with this
standard.41 Kuhlmeier adopted Justice Brennan’s Fraser concurrence: “A
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school.”42
The Court’s most recent school-speech opinion is commonly referred
to as the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus!” case.43 Joseph Frederick, a high school stu-
dent, unfurled a 14-foot banner that bore that phrase during a school-sanc-
tioned field trip to watch the Olympic Torch Relay pass through Juneau,
Alaska on its way to Salt Lake City.44 The school principal, Deborah
Morse, immediately demanded Frederick take it down.45 Morse explained
after the incident that she believed the banner “encouraged illegal drug
use,” which was against school policy.46 Frederick refused to remove the
banner. Morse then suspended Frederick for ten days, and Frederick subse-
quently sued Morse for violating his First Amendment rights.47 The Su-
preme Court upheld Frederick’s suspension even though he was on a public
sidewalk at the time of the episode, and not on the school premises.48 Es-
sentially, the Court rejected Frederick’s geographical limitation on school
authority over student speech, instead reasoning that school authority over
student speech extends to field trips: “Frederick cannot stand in the midst of
his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and
claim he is not at school.”49 Notably, the Court did recognize there was
“some uncertainty” as to the “outer boundaries” of school authority over
student speech, but “not on [Morse’s] facts.”50 Citing the “special charac-
teristics of the school environment” and schools’ interest in curbing illegal
drug use, the Court held that schools may discipline students for speech that
they “reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”51 The Morse Court
carefully explained that its holding applied only to speech that occurred on-
campus. The Court made this point by using Tinker’s special characteristics
language and pointing out that its other cases were similarly tethered to the
40. Id. at 273.
41. Id. at 274–275.
42. Id. at 266 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
43. See e.g. Rodney A. Smolla, School-sanctioned Events: Morse v. Frederick the “Bong Hits 4
Jesus” Case, 2 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 17:4.50 (2013).
44. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
45. Id. at 398.
46. Id. at 398.
47. Id. at 398–399.
48. Id. at 400–401.
49. Id. at 401 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
50. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.
51. Id. at 408.
6
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school environment: “Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public fo-
rum outside the school context, it would have been protected.”52
From these cases, lower courts have concluded that Tinker forms the
general rule and Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse form exceptions. Thus,
schools may discipline students for lewd, vulgar, or profane language,
speech that could be interpreted as the school’s own, and speech that pro-
motes illegal drug use regardless of disruption. And speech “falling outside
of these categories is subject to Tinker’s general rule: it may be regulated
only if it would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere with the
rights of others.”53
Currently, as students move the forum of their speech from within the
schoolhouse gate and onto the internet, these decisions are being stretched
beyond their holdings. This article argues that the reality of teaching in the
internet age necessitates the extension of Tinker to internet speech under
certain circumstances—specifically when the speech has a sufficient nexus
to the school environment.54 The Court has, after all, revised its constitu-
tional doctrines in other areas when technological advances have outgrown
its jurisprudence. One lucid example is the Court’s personal jurisdiction
decisions.
III. THE NOT-SO “ETERNAL PRINCIPLES” OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION55
The Supreme Court has revised its personal jurisdiction holdings to
meet the difficulties of advancing technology. This article argues that the
internet is such a technological shift in the student-speech realm as to war-
rant a revision of the Court’s school-speech framework.
As early as 1813, individual members of the United States Supreme
Court called the rule that a court could not exert its jurisdiction over persons
found outside its geographical boundaries one of the “eternal principles of
justice . . . .”56 In the 1877 case Pennoyer v. Neff,57 the Court formally
adopted this “eternal principle,” holding that an Oregon state court violated
52. Id. at 405.
53. Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001).
54. For an explanation of what constitutes a sufficient nexus, see infra Section V.
55. While it draws an analogy to personal jurisdiction cases, this article does not argue that courts
should apply personal jurisdiction principles to student speech. For an excellent discussion of this
position not taken, see generally Brenton, supra n. 28.
56. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481, 486 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting). In Mills, the plaintiff sought
to enforce a debt order issued by a New York court. The defendant pleaded nil debet—a plea that he did
not owe the money and should not have to pay it. David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and
Credit, 118 Yale L.J. 1584, 1648 (2009). The question presented was whether the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution prevented the defendant from pleading nil debet (that he should not have to
pay the New York judgment). Mills, 11 U.S. at 483 (majority). The Court ruled that the Judiciary Act of
1790 required the court to honor the judgment. Mills, id. at 483–484 (majority). Justice Johnson dis-
sented because he believed allowing the nil debet plea was the only way to ensure a court enforcing
7
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due process when it asserted its adjudicatory power over a defendant who
was not present within Oregon’s borders.58
Yet following Pennoyer, courts struggled to apply its rule.59 As a lead-
ing treatise explains, it was the wrong tool for the job:
The philosophy underlying Pennoyer v. Neff may well have been adequate at
a time when the average person’s mobility was limited, commerce was local
in character, and territorial notions did not represent too great an impediment
on a plaintiff’s ability to institute his action . . . . But as the United States
became a mobile, industrialized society, the doctrine of Pennoyer proved to
be inadequate and the courts were forced to deviate from its principles and
adjust them to the changing times.60
Simply put, as technology made it easier for people to conduct activities
across state borders, the bright-line Pennoyer rule became harder to defend,
and courts began to stray. In the 1930s, for example, the Court dealt with an
increasingly mobile society by holding that the state of a defendant’s domi-
cile had personal jurisdiction over the defendant regardless of the defen-
dant’s location at the time he was personally served.61 And, in 1927, the
Court upheld “implied consent” statutes that created personal jurisdiction
over non-resident defendants who used state highways.62 Corporations also
pushed Pennoyer’s territorial rule to the breaking point. As heavy users of
advancing technology, corporations “simply refused to remain penned up
within their own states of incorporation.”63
This history illustrates that courts faced with an outdated framework
will find a way around it. In International Shoe Company v. Washington,64
another’s judgment would be able to determine whether the first court had proper jurisdiction. Id. at 486
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
57. 95 U.S 714 (1877).
58. Id. at 733.
59. Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 753,
755 (2003).
60. Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 4 § 1064, 345
(3d ed., West 2002) (italics added).
61. Id. at 410–450. The Court first decided Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), where
it upheld a federal statute allowing service of United States citizens in foreign countries. Id. at 438 (“The
jurisdiction of the United States over its absent citizen, so far as the binding effect of its legislation is
concerned, is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of the laws that are
applicable to him and to obey them.”). Then, in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), the Court
applied this principle to the states. Id. at 464 (“The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges inci-
dent to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such incidence of domicile
is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state . . . .”).
62. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354, 356 (1927) (upholding Massachusetts’s statute that
conferred personal jurisdiction over non-resident drivers who committed torts on its highways, even if
the defendant was served outside Massachusetts); Kane v. N.J., 242 U.S. 160, 165–166, 169 (1916)
(upholding conviction for failing to comply with New Jersey statute requiring non-resident drivers to
submit an application consenting to service on an appointed agent outside New Jersey).
63. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963).
64. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8
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the Court reviewed its post-Pennoyer decisions and acknowledged that it
had strayed from its territorial rule.65 The Court approved the deviation,
however, and subsequently rejected Pennoyer’s rigid formula in favor of
the flexible “minimum contacts” test.66 The territorial restriction on per-
sonal jurisdiction requiring the defendant’s physical presence in the forum
state was no longer an “eternal principle of justice.”
Following International Shoe, the Court refined the minimum contacts
test in numerous opinions not relevant here.67 But the Court’s 1984 decision
Calder v. Jones68 does bear import to connecting personal jurisdiction and
school-speech jurisprudence, as it was the Court’s first application of the
minimum contacts test to speech. In that case, a California actress sued two
National Enquirer employees,69 alleging they wrote and edited an article
that libeled her.70 The defendants, who resided in and prepared the article in
Florida, moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that due process prevented
California courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over them.71 The Su-
preme Court disagreed, even though the defendants showed that they were
not responsible for the National Enquirer’s distribution of the article in Cal-
ifornia, because “California [was] the focal point both of the story and the
harm suffered.”72 Essentially, the Court reasoned that the defendants could
not write and edit a story aimed at a California audience (National Enquirer
had a large California readership) knowing the story would impact the Cali-
fornia actress, and claim immunity from California court authority.73 The
Calder Court had once again added to the due process analysis by adopting
the “effects test.”74
In sum, the Court’s willingness to revise the doctrine of personal juris-
diction, from Pennoyer, to International Shoe, to Calder, ensured that its
rulings continued to reflect reality instead of steadfast adherence to prior
holdings. In a span of just over 100 years, the Court went from proclaiming
geographical limitations of personal jurisdiction as an “eternal principal of
65. Id. at 316 (noting that Pennoyer’s requirement that the defendant be present “within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the court” had given way to the requirement that the defendant have “certain mini-
mum contacts with [the territorial jurisdiction] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
66. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken, 311 U.S at 463 (1940)).
67. See Wright & Miller, supra n. 60, at 403–462 (annotations for cases subsequent to Interna-
tional Shoe that clarified and elaborated on the minimum contacts test).
68. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
69. One employee was a reporter, the other was the president and editor. Id. at 785–786.
70. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784–786. (The article alleged that the actress, Shirley Jones, drank so
heavily “as to prevent her from fulfilling her professional obligations.”) Id. at 788 n. 9.
71. Id. at 784–786.
72. Id. at 789.
73. Id. at 789–790.
74. Id. at 787.
9
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justice” to upholding personal jurisdiction over individuals who resided in a
state thousands of miles away from the forum state because the individuals
had purposefully targeted the forum state. Just as the Court revised its per-
sonal jurisdiction framework to account for technological advances, the
Court should likewise update its school-speech framework to permit
schools to combat disruptive student speech that takes place on the internet.
IV. LOWER COURTS’ STRUGGLES TO DISCERN THE SCOPE OF SCHOOL
AUTHORITY IN THE INTERNET AGE
Just as lower courts strayed from Pennoyer’s holding, lower courts
have strayed from Tinker’s geographical limitations. Indeed, not a single
circuit has adhered to geographical boundaries. Instead, these courts take
several approaches.
Some courts have ignored its limitations and applied Tinker “without
regard to the location where the speech originated (off-campus or on-cam-
pus).”75 For example, the Ninth Circuit in LaVine v. Blaine School Dis-
trict76 upheld a school’s emergency expulsion of a student who wrote a
graphic poem about killing his classmates.77 The student wrote the poem
over the summer while at home and did not turn it in to his English teacher
until months later to get her opinion.78 The school expelled him.79 The
Ninth Circuit analyzed the student’s speech under Tinker after reiterating
the generally accepted framework that speech that is lewd or vulgar falls
under Fraser, speech that bears the school imprimatur falls under
Kuhlmeier, and speech that does not fall under those cases is governed by
Tinker. Reasoning that the poem was not Fraser or Kuhlmeier speech, the
Ninth Circuit analyzed the school’s actions under Tinker’s substantial dis-
ruption test and upheld the suspension because the poem could reasonably
be seen as a “cry for help” from a student who was “intending to inflict
harm on himself or others.”80 The jurisdictions that follow this approach
have deviated the furthest from Tinker’s geographically-tethered holding.
Other courts have considered the location of the speech important to
the analysis. Before applying Tinker, the Second Circuit first asks whether
it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech “would reach school property
75. J. C. ex rel. R. C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1103 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (collecting cases that apply this standard).
76. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
77. Id. at 983.
78. Id. at 983–984.
79. Id. at 986.
80. Id. at 989–990.
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 75 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol75/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\75-1\MON101.txt unknown Seq: 11 18-FEB-14 16:06
2014 TINKER IN THE INTERNET AGE 113
and have disruptive consequences there.”81 In Doninger v. Niehoff,82 for
example, the court held that a school had the authority to discipline Avery
Doninger for her blog post that criticized the school’s postponement of a
concert and encouraged other students to add comments and contact school
officials.83 The court concluded that the content and context of Doninger’s
post brought her within the purview of school authority because the post
“directly pertained” to a school event and invited other students to contact
other school officials to complain.84 The court next determined that Don-
inger’s post was “potentially disruptive to the degree required by Tinker.”85
The school received a “deluge of phone calls and emails,” taking adminis-
trators away from their normal duties for two days, and a group of students
gathered outside the principal’s office in protest.86 The Second Circuit held
that discipline was proper for the off-campus post because it was reasonably
foreseeable the post would be brought to the school’s attention; it pertained
to school activities and targeted fellow students as its audience—and the
post was potentially disruptive under Tinker. This test is narrower than the
Ninth Circuit’s test, outlined above, which applies Tinker regardless of
where the student speaks. A panel of the Eighth Circuit adopted the foresee-
ability test plus Tinker in D.J.M ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School
District Number 60.87
The Third Circuit remains coy about the appropriate test for off-cam-
pus speech, even though J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School Dis-
trict88 and Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District89
presented en banc panels with strikingly similar facts in 2011.90 In J.S. ex
rel. Snyder, a middle school student created a mock Myspace profile of her
principal.91 The profile included a picture of the principal and contained
“adult language and sexually explicit content.”92 After some students told
J.S. they thought the profile was funny, J.S. made the profile “private,”
limiting public access of the page but giving access to approximately 22
81. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 348 (2d Cir. 2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport
Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007).
82. Doninger, 642 F.3d 334.
83. Id. at 348.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 349.
86. Id. at 349.
87. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011).
88. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
89. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
90. On June 13, 2011, the Third Circuit handed down J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d 915 and
Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d 205.
91. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920.
92. Id. at 920–921. The profile stated the principal’s interests as, inter alia, “fucking in my office,
hitting on students and their parents,” and that he was a “sex addict, fagass” and put on the “world with a
small dick . . . .”
11
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fellow students.93 One teacher had to tell students to stop talking about the
profile and return to their schoolwork, and the principal’s wife (a guidance
counselor at the school) cancelled student appointments for one day to deal
with the posting.94 The principal suspended J.S., who subsequently sued the
school district for violating her First Amendment right to free speech.95 The
district court granted summary judgment for the school district, even though
it found the disruptions were not substantial under Tinker.96 Instead, the
district court ruled that the school district could discipline J.S. under Fraser
because the profile was lewd, vulgar, and offensive and had a sufficient
connection to the school.97
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Fraser was limited
to lewd, vulgar, or offensive speech that occurs on-campus.98 The court
next turned to whether Tinker authorized the school district’s actions.99 No-
tably, the Third Circuit acknowledged that there was still a question as to
whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech: “we will assume, without de-
ciding, that Tinker applies to J.S.’s speech in this case.”100 Since the district
court ruled there had not been an actual substantial disruption, the school
district defended its actions by asserting it was reasonable for the school to
forecast that there would have been such a disruption.101 The court dis-
agreed, reasoning that J.S. took “specific steps” to restrict access to the
profile when she made it an invite-only page and the disruption only arose
because of the principal’s disproportionate response.102 Although the court
admitted it had not formally decided Tinker was appropriate, its use of the
test demonstrates the court did not believe Tinker’s geographical restric-
tions are a bright-line rule.103
93. Id. at 921.
94. Id. at 922–923.
95. Id. at 920, 923.
96. Id. at 923.
97. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 923. In determining there was a connection with the school, the
district court noted the profile was about the school’s principal, was targeted at fellow students as an
audience, a paper copy of the website was brought into the school and was viewed by the principal, and
J.S. created the website to retaliate for being disciplined for dress-code violations.
98. Id. at 932–933 (“In other words, Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard cannot be extended to justify a
school’s punishment of J.S. for her use of profane language outside the school, during non-school
hours.”).
99. Id. at 926.
100. Id. The court acknowledged it was using Tinker out of convenience: “The appellants argue that
the First Amendment ‘limits school official[s’] ability to sanction student speech to the schoolhouse
itself.’ While this argument has some appeal, we need not address it to hold that the School District
violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights.” Id. at 926 n.3.
101. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 928 (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 930–931.
103. Five members of the en banc court did, however, write separately to assert Tinker should not
apply to off-campus speech. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 936 (Smith, J., with McKee, C.J., Sloviter,
Fuentes, and Hardiman, JJ., joining) (“I would hold that [Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech],
12
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On the same day, the Third Circuit handed down Layshock. Once
again, the court avoided deciding whether Tinker applied to off-campus
speech.104 Rather, the court applied Tinker out of convenience because
there was no substantial disruption.105 Like J.S., Justin Layshock created a
parody Myspace page of his principal using a picture from the school’s
website; the profile depicted the principal as a steroid user, alcohol abuser,
drug addict, and sexually promiscuous.106 Layshock granted access to his
fellow students, and talk of the profile “spread like wildfire,” inspiring
copy-cat pages.107 The principal’s daughter, a fellow student, saw the page
and told her father.108 The principal was distressed about the profile, which
he found “degrading, demeaning, demoralizing, and shocking.”109 In re-
sponse to students’ accessing the profile at school, the school limited com-
puter access to times when students could be supervised.110 The school dis-
trict suspended Layshock,111 arguing its actions were proper under Fraser
and Tinker.112 The district court rejected the proposition that Fraser applied
to off-campus speech113 and found the school district was unable to show
Layshock’s profile caused a substantial disruption at the school.114 On ap-
peal, the school district did not challenge the district court’s conclusion that
there was not a substantial disruption.115 Instead, the school district argued
Fraser should apply to vulgar and offensive speech that takes place off-
and that the First Amendment protects students from engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent
it protects speech by citizens in the community at large.”).
104. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219–220 (Jordan and Vanaskie, JJ., concurring) (noting
that neither Layshock ex rel. Layshock nor J.S. ex rel. Snyder resolved whether Tinker applies to off-
campus speech).
105. Id. at 214 (“At the outset, it is important to note that the district court found that the [School]
District could not establish a sufficient nexus between Justin’s speech and a substantial disruption of the
school environment, and the School District does not challenge that finding on appeal. Therefore, the
School District is not arguing it could properly punish Justin under the Tinker exception for student
speech that causes a material and substantial disruption of the school environment.” (internal citations
omitted)).
106. Id. at 207–208.
107. Id. at 208.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 209 (individual quotations in original removed).
110. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 209.
111. Id. at 210 (The school district suspended Layshock for ten days. It also moved Layshock into a
program for students with behavior problems, and prohibited him from participating in extracurricular
activities and graduation.).
112. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F.Supp.2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (“Defendants seek
to justify their punishment of Justin under either the Tinker or Fraser tests.”).
113. Id. at 599–600.
114. Id. at 600 (“As to the Tinker test, the Court concludes that, even construing the evidence in a
light most favorable to Defendants, they have not established a sufficient nexus between Justin’s speech
and a substantial disruption of the school environment.”).
115. Id. at 214.
13
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campus but has a sufficient nexus to the school.116 Layshock’s actions were
sufficiently connected to the school, the district argued, because Layshock
entered the school’s property (its website) to obtain the principal’s picture
and the profile targeted the school district community.117
The Third Circuit correctly declined to extend Fraser, reasoning the
Supreme Court had explicitly limited Fraser to on-campus speech.118 The
Third Circuit rejected the proposition that the school should be able to dis-
cipline vulgar, lewd, and offensive speech simply because it was targeted at
the school environment and was likely to come to the attention of school
officials.119 The Third Circuit did acknowledge the circumstances would be
different had Layshock’s profile caused a substantial disruption: “We need
not now define the precise parameters of when the arm of authority can
reach beyond the schoolhouse gate because, as we noted earlier, the district
court found Justin’s conduct did not disrupt the school, and the District does
not appeal that finding.”120 In distinguishing its decision from other deci-
sions upholding school discipline for off-campus speech, the Third Circuit
noted those cases involved speech that substantially disrupted the school.121
Those cases, the court reasoned, “stand for nothing more than the un-
remarkable proposition that schools may punish expressive conduct that oc-
curs outside of school, as if it occurred inside the ‘schoolhouse gate,’ under
certain very limited circumstances, none of which are present here.”122
With these two opinions, the Third Circuit made clear that it would not
extend Fraser to off-campus speech. Whether, and under what circum-
stances, the Third Circuit will approve school discipline for student off-
campus speech that substantially disrupts the school environment remains a
viable question, however.
While most western states have not had court cases addressing the
proper jurisdictional boundaries of school authority, a survey of student
handbooks shows school authority varies by school district. In response to
cyberbullying, many school districts have responded by expanding their ju-
risdiction to off-campus activities that have the effect of disrupting school
work. For instance, the Anchorage School District purports to have jurisdic-
tion over off-campus activities “if the [student’s] behavior clearly has nega-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (In Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court stated:
“Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been
protected.” 551 U.S. at 405 (2007)).
119. Id. at 216–219.
120. Id. at 219.
121. Id. at 217 (distinguishing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002)).
122.  Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219.
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tive consequences for the welfare, safety, or morals of other students
. . . .”
123
 This broad jurisdiction rings of applying unmodified Tinker—if
the speech substantially disrupts on-campus activities, the location of the
speech is not relevant. On the other hand, in Montana, Helena School Dis-
trict #1 purports to limit its jurisdiction to only those activities taking place
while the student is under the “supervision and control of the school.”124
This far narrower jurisdiction would prohibit school authority from reach-
ing student internet activity that takes place outside of Tinker’s schoolhouse
gate.
Two courts struck the correct balance. First, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered the location of the speech relevant but not dispositive to
the inquiry in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District.125 In that case, J.S.
created a webpage that made “derogatory, offensive, and threatening com-
ments” primarily targeted at his algebra teacher.126 News of the website
spread and came to the school’s attention.127 After viewing the website, the
teacher was unable to return to work that year and the school district
granted her leave for the remaining school year.128 After he was expelled,
J.S. sued in Pennsylvania state court, asserting the school district violated
his First Amendment rights.129 The trial court and intermediate appellate
court affirmed the school district’s expulsion, and J.S. appealed to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court.130
123. Anchorage School District, 2012–13 High School Student Handbook III, (2012) (available at
http://www.asdk12.org/forms/uploads/HS_handbook.pdf). The entire jurisdictional statement reads:
“The following rules apply on school grounds, at school activities on and off school grounds, on school
buses, and at school bus stops. These rules also apply to acts that: 1. Begin on school grounds and end
off school grounds; or 2. Begin off school grounds and continue on school grounds; 3. Pose a likelihood
of disruption of education or conduct at the school; or 4. Occur when the student is on the way to school
or leaving school. In addition, students may be disciplined for behavior on or off school grounds that
takes place at any time if the behavior clearly has negative consequences for the welfare, safety, or
morals of other students or a person employed or volunteering at the school. The District should not
exercise this jurisdiction with respect to conduct that has little or no actual or likely impact on the school
community.”
124. Capital High School, 2012–2013 Student/Parent Handbook 66 (2012) (available at http://www.
helena.k12.mt.us/images/documents/handbooks/CHS%20Handbook%202012-2013.pdf). The entire ju-
risdictional statement reads: “A student shall not: 1.1 Engage in Disruptive Behavior - Behavior dis-
played verbally or through action toward a school official or policy of the school so the normal routine
of the classroom or activity is significantly disrupted. This includes both verbal and physical hazing,
conduct on school premises, going to and from school, while riding on any school transportation, or
attending or participating in any school sponsored activity while within the jurisdiction, supervision, and
control of the school.”
125. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002).
126. Id. at 851.
127. Id. at 851–852.
128. Id. at 852.
129. Id. at 853.
130. Id.
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In an opinion also affirming the school district’s expulsion of J.S., the
Court pointed out that times had changed since 1969: “Tinker’s simple arm-
band, worn silently and brought into a Des Moines, Iowa classroom, has
been replaced by J.S.’s complex multimedia web site, accessible to fellow
students, teachers, and the world.”131 In outlining the appropriate analysis,
the Court stated the location of the speech (i.e., on-campus or off-campus)
was a “threshold issue.”132 The Court then looked to case law to determine
whether the website qualified as on-campus or off-campus speech and
adopted the approach that speech originating off-campus can nonetheless
morph into on-campus speech in certain circumstances.133 The Court held:
“speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought
onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator . . . will be
considered on-campus speech.”134 The Court was careful, however, not to
foreclose the possibility that off-campus speech could become on-campus
speech, even without the originator accessing the website from school, if
others accessed it while at school.135
Since it determined J.S.’s website was on-campus speech, the Court
next had to decide whether it could rule Fraser made discipline proper for
the unquestionably vulgar and offensive speech or whether the school was
required to make a showing of actual or potential disruption under
Tinker.136 The Court applied both cases and concluded that “application of
either case results in a determination in favor of the School District.”137
Under Tinker, the Court determined the website caused an actual substantial
disruption to the school when Mrs. Fulmer took leave for the rest of the
school year, requiring numerous substitute teachers; when students sought
counselors because they were feeling anxious about their safety; and when
“there was a feeling of helplessness and low morale” in the school.138
The Fourth Circuit, in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,139 has
likewise applied Tinker to off-campus, internet speech, so long as the
131. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 864.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 864–865 (collecting cases that have analyzed speech originating off-campus that made its
way on-campus).
134. Id. at 865.
135. Id. (“While the fact that J.S. personally accessed his website on school grounds is a strong
factor in our assessment, we do not discount that one who posts school-targeted material in a manner
known to be freely accessible from school grounds may run the risk of being deemed to have engaged in
on-campus speech, where actual accessing by others in fact occurs, depending upon the totality of the
circumstances involved.”).
136. Id. at 866–867 (collecting cases).
137. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 867.
138. Id. at 869.
139. Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
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speech has a “sufficient nexus” to the school environment.140 In 2005, Kara
Kowalski used her home computer after school hours to create a webpage
titled “S.A.S.H.” or “Students Against Sluts Herpes.”141 After creating the
page, Kowalski invited 100 friends, including two dozen fellow students, to
access and post pictures and comments on the page about another class-
mate, Shay N.142 Students, including Kowalski, posted comments accusing
Shay N. of having herpes and being sexually promiscuous.143 One student
also posted two pictures of Shay N.144 On the first, he drew “red dots on
Shay N.’s face to simulate herpes and added a sign near her pelvic region,
that read, ‘Warning: Enter at your own risk.’”145 On the second picture, the
student “captioned Shay N.’s face with a sign that read, ‘portrait of a
whore.’”146 Fellow students responded by commenting on how funny the
pictures were and calling Kowalski “awesome” and a “hero” for creating
the webpage.147 The morning following the webpage’s creation, Shay N.
and her parents showed school administrators a printout of the “S.A.S.H”
website.148 Shay N. did not attend school that day because she felt uncom-
fortable about attending class with those who had posted comments on the
webpage.149 After school administrators suspended Kowalski, she sued the
school for violating her First Amendment rights, arguing the school was
prohibited from disciplining her for “private out-of-school speech.”150
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected Kowalski’s assertion of a strict
geographical limitation on school authority, noting that her argument was
based on a “metaphysical” distinction that did not make sense in the in-
ternet age.151 Instead, the panel held that the relevant inquiry was whether
140. Id. at 572–573. The Fourth Circuit first determined Kowalski’s speech “caused the interference
and disruption described in Tinker as being immune from First Amendment protection.” Id. at 572. The
court then went on to note “the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to [the school’s] pedagogical interests was
sufficiently strong to justify” the school’s actions. Id. at 573.
141. Id. at 567.
142. Id. at 567.
143. Id. at 568.
144. Id.




149. Id. at 568.
150. Id. at 567–569.
151. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (“[Kowalski’s argument] raises the metaphysical question of where
her speech occurred when she used the Internet as the medium. Kowalski indeed pushed her computer’s
keys in her home, but she knew that the electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published
beyond her home and could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the school environ-
ment.”).
17
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there was a sufficient nexus between the speech and the school.152 The
court concluded the webpage’s content focused on a student, Shay N., and
Kowalski’s target audience was students.153 The court then turned to Tinker
and determined the school district’s actions were warranted because there
was an actual substantial disruption (Shay N. was unable to attend school)
and, alternatively, a potential substantial disruption was real because, absent
punishment, students would be likely to continue to harass Shay N. and
might create “copy-cat” webpages.154 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, allows
schools to discipline students for off-campus, internet speech, if the speech
has a sufficient nexus to the school environment and satisfies Tinker.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE “SUFFICIENT NEXUS” TEST
The Supreme Court should revise its rule regarding student speech to
reflect modern technological advances like the internet, just as it allowed its
personal jurisdiction rules to evolve. Not a single circuit has held a school
may not punish students for speech that originates off-campus. The Court
should adopt the Fourth Circuit’s sufficient nexus test to determine whether
the speech is on- or off-campus. To determine if speech is sufficiently con-
nected to the school environment to be considered on-campus speech,
courts should look to: (1) the topic of the speech; and (2) the intended audi-
ence of the speech.155
If the topic of the speech is school-related (i.e., the speech is about a
teacher, staff member, or student the speaker only knows through a school
relationship), then the first prong is satisfied. This requirement is necessary
to ensure speech unrelated to the school’s legitimate pedagogical concerns
is not ensnared. To borrow an example: “If Mary Beth Tinker had appeared
on the evening news to protest the Vietnam War, it could have caused a
greater disruption of her school than her black armband . . . .”156 This
speech would not satisfy the first prong, however, because it is not related
to the school environment.
The second prong—the speaker’s targeted audience—likewise nar-
rows the speech that is punishable by requiring courts to determine whether
the student is using the internet as a proxy to get away with speech that
would not be allowed at school. While this prong is admittedly broad (after
152. Id. at 577 (“Suffice it to hold here that, where such speech has a sufficient nexus with the
school, the Constitution is not written to hinder school administrators’ good faith efforts to address the
problem.”).
153. Id. at 567.
154. Id. at 574.
155. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573–574 (concluding Kowalski’s speech was targeted to a student
audience and was regarding a fellow student).
156. Brenton, supra n. 28, at 1227.
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all, most students speak to their peers), it is not automatic, and it will filter
out private speech such as online journals and webpages with limited ac-
cess.157 If a court determines the speech satisfies both prongs, then it is on-
campus speech and is subject to Tinker’s substantial disruption test.
Tinker stands as the final protector of a student’s speech. While the
circuits differ on what satisfies Tinker, it is fair to say Tinker is not auto-
matic approval for school districts. For instance, both of the Third Circuit
decisions noted above, J.S. ex rel. Snyder and Layshock—in which students
created websites that accused their principals of being, among other things,
pedophiles, sex addicts, and drug users—were decided in favor of the stu-
dent because there was not a disruption sufficient under Tinker.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court should ensure that schools’ authority
to discipline speech is not frozen in 1969 with Tinker by adopting the suffi-
cient nexus test, which accounts for the realities of teaching in the internet
age. The Court has updated its jurisprudence in other areas. In the personal
jurisdiction context, the Court expanded upon the once-thought “eternal
principal of justice” that limited personal jurisdiction over a defendant to
the state in which that defendant resided when technology made that princi-
ple obsolete. Now, the Court stands at a similar crossroad with its school-
speech precedent. The only question is whether the Court will realize that
technology has made Tinker’s geographic limitations obsolete. Just as most
schools no longer employ gates to demarcate the boundaries of the school,
the physical premises of the school no longer demarcate where a student’s
speech can affect the operation of the school.
157. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 940 (noting J.S. took affirmative steps to limit dissemination
of the parody profile by making the profile “private”); see also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393
F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that a student’s drawing of his school under siege was not on-
campus speech because he kept the drawing at home in a cabinet for two years and never intended for
his brother to accidently take his drawing pad to school where a teacher saw the drawing).
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